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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, United States customs officials detained Zak Reed nine
separate times as Mr. Reed returned from visiting his in-laws in
Canada.' According to Mr. Reed, on one occasion, customs officials
"completely trashed" his car, questioned him for nearly three hours,
and broke his son's portable DVD player.2 Mr. Reed also recalled one
customs officer stating, "[W]e're really too good to these detainees.
We should treat them like we do in the desert. We should put a bag
over their heads and zip tie their hands together."' This treatment
is especially shocking because Mr. Reed is a firefighter in his home-
town of Toledo, Ohio, a twenty-year veteran of the Ohio National
Guard, and customs officials never discovered anything incrim-
inating during their examinations.4 Ten years ago, however, Mr.
Reed changed his name from Edward Eugene Reed to Zakariya
Muhammad Reed, after he converted to Islam.' Following that
change, Mr. Reed became the target of heightened scrutiny-
including the detention of his cell phone-whenever he reentered
the United States.6
Yasir Qadhi, a native Texan and a doctoral student at Yale
University, has received similar treatment at the border.7 In 2006,
1. Cynthia Bowers, U.S. Citizens Question Terror Watch Lists, Dec. 8, 2007, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/08/eveningnews/main3595024.shtml.
2. Matthew Rothchild, Letter to the Editor, Muslim American Grilled at Border Over
Religion, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 9, 2007, http://www.progressive.org/mag-mc050907.
3. Id.
4. Bowers, supra note 1. Farhana Y. Khera, the president of Muslim Advocates, testified
at a Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing regarding a person that was most likely Mr. Reed.
According to Ms. Khera, "A firefighter, 20-year former member of the National Guard, Gulf
War veteran, and current member of the local Homeland Security Emergency Response Team
in Toledo, OH has been questioned on numerous occasions since 2006 at the Detroit
Ambassador Bridge while trying to visit family members in Ontario, Canada." Laptop
Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas Travel
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 134 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Farhana Y. Khera, President &
Executive Director, Muslim Advocates).
5. Bowers, supra note 1.
6. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 134 (testimony of Farhana Y. Khera) (describing how
customs officials searched his cell phone).
7. See Ellen Nakashima, Expanded Powers to Search Travelers at Border Detailed,
WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A2; Tara Dooley, Islamic Scholar, a Houston Native, Brings
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customs officials detained Mr. Qadhi, his wife, and his three
children for five and a half hours while conducting a border search.'
During the inspection, the officials took Mr. Qadhi's cell phone and
copied all of the data it contained.9 Two years later, in the spring of
2008, the FBI brought Mr. Qadhi back in for questioning regarding
the contacts contained within the phone. 10 Mr. Qadhi was never
found to be involved in anything illegal and has even served as a
counter-terrorism consultant for the federal government."
The stories of Mr. Reed and Mr. Qadhi are not isolated inci-
dents. 2 In fact, the Association of Corporate Travel Executives
conducted a survey in February 2008 and reported that seven
percent of the executives surveyed stated "they had been subject to
the seizure of a laptop or other electronic device" while reentering
the country." In July 2008, due to the growing concern over customs
officials seizing electronic devices, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (the CBP) took the "unprecedented step" of pub-
lishing its policy.'4 This policy, entitled "U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Policy Regarding Border Search of Information" (CBP
Policy), was released in an effort to clarify the CBP's practices and
procedures regarding the treatment of documents and electronic
files during border inspections.'5 The CBP Policy appears to address
Cultural Insight to Lectures on His Religion, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2005_3909962.
8. Nakashima, supra note 7, at A2.
9. Id.
10. Id. A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spokesperson refused to comment on
Mr. Qadhi's specific case. The spokesperson claimed that the agency does not racially profile,
but DHS has the authority to question any person entering the United States. Id.
11. Mr. Qadhi's profile matches that of a Muslim American described during Ms. Khera's
Senate statement. According to that statement, Mr. Qadhi "has been consulted as an expert
by federal government agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center and the
Department of State." Hearing, supra note 4, at 134-35 (testimony of Farhana Y. Khera).
12. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Terror Fears Hamper U.S. Muslims' Travel, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2006, availableathttp://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/us/nationalspecial3/Oltraveler.
html?_r=2&pagewanted=l.
13. Hearing, supra note 4, at 11 (statement of Susan K. Gurley, Executive Director,
Association of Corporate Travel Executives).
14. Jayson Ahern, Laptop Inspections Legal, Rare, Essential, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/traveladmissibility/labtop-inspect.xml.
15. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Policy
Regarding Border Search of Information, July 16, 2008, available at http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/search.authority.ctt/search_ authority.pdf [hereinafter
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
situations like Mr. Reed's and Mr. Qadhi's and reads, "in the course
of every border search, CBP will protect the rights of individuals
against unreasonable search and seizure."16 The purpose of this
Note is to illustrate that, to the contrary, the CBP Policy does not
protect against unreasonable seizures. In reality, the CBP Policy
authorizes the suspicionless seizure and detention of any electronic
device "for a reasonable period of time to perform a thorough border
search."17
The Supreme Court has recognized that only the federal govern-
ment can effectively patrol America's borders and has held that
customs officials may conduct suspicionless border searches at the
international border under the "border search exception" to the
Fourth Amendment." This exception applies to each of the four
hundred million travelers that enter or reenter the United States
each year.'9 The Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
applied the border search exception and allowed suspicionless
border searches of electronic devices, but no court, nor legal schol-
arship, has addressed the topic of suspicionless border seizures of
electronic devices or files.2 °
This Note will argue that, in order to properly protect the rights
of travelers, the Court should limit the border search exception and
return to a privacy-based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's
Seizure Clause. This privacy-based interpretation was first artic-
CBP Policy]. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has a similar policy which
states, "At any point during a border search, documents and electronic media, or copies
thereof, may be detained for further review, either on-site at the place of detention or at an
off-site location." ICE Policy System, Border Searches of Documents and Electronic Media,
July 16, 2008, available at http://www.cdt.orglsecurity/20080716 ICE%2OSearch%20Policy.
pdf. Although many of the issues are the same, this Note will focus on only the CBP Policy.
16. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 1.
17. Id. at 2. The CBP Policy also states, "[O]fficers may examine documents, books,
pamphlets, and other printed material, as well as computers, disks, hard drives, and other
electronic or digital storage devices. These examinations are part of CBP's long-standing
practice and are essential to uncovering vital law enforcement information." Id. at 1.
18. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977) ("Mhe border-search exception is
grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations
imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country.").
19. Ellen Nakashima, Travelers' Laptops May Be Detained at Border, WASH. POST, Aug.
1, 2008, atAl.
20. See United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393
F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
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ulated over thirty years ago in Katz v. United States21 and Berger v.
New York, 2 when the Court acknowledged that both tangible and
intangible property could be seized.23 Accordingly, the Katz/Berger
test would require government officials to develop probable cause
before copying electronic files.24
This Note articulates the proper Fourth Amendment analysis
that should govern border seizures of electronic files and suggests
ways to improve the current CBP Policy. To accomplish this, Part I
describes the history of the Fourth Amendment, the creation of the
border search exception, and reviews the federal appellate courts'
decisions involving suspicionless border searches. Part II analyzes
the CBP Policy, whereas Part III explains how the Supreme Court
determines what constitutes a reasonable search as opposed to a
reasonable seizure. Part IV further examines the Katz/Berger test
and demonstrates that even under the Court's current property-
based test, the CBP Policy wrongly permits unreasonable seizures.
Part V investigates additional problems that the CBP Policy does
not properly address, such as racial and religious profiling and the
disclosure of privileged information. Finally, Part VI analyzes
proposed legislation and outlines recommendations that should be
implemented in order to strike the proper balance between govern-
mental interests and the individual property and privacy rights of
travelers entering or leaving the United States. Ultimately, this
Note illustrates that the CBP Policy stretches the government's
authority too far. Suspicionless seizures are not within the Supreme
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
23. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59.
24. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. This Note argues for a probable cause standard instead of
reasonable suspicion because the border search exception shifts the Fourth Amendment
balance in the government's favor and allows government officials to conduct suspicionless
searches. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). As a result, the government
is given a great amount of latitude to develop probable cause during the initial border search;
thus, it should be held to a higher standard of suspicion. The Supreme Court defined probable
cause as follows: "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a
man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645
(1878)).
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Court's border search exception and, thus, are unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.25
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BORDER
SEARCH EXCEPTION
The driving force behind the Fourth Amendment can be traced to
the American Colonies and England's use of general warrants to
search colonial homes for the evidence of any crime. 26 Accordingly,
the Fourth Amendment has been described as "the one procedural
safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events
which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with
England."27 The Supreme Court, however, has not translated the
Fourth Amendment "into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,"'
but the Court has held that the amendment does protect "individual
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion. 28
In order to determine which governmental intrusions (searches
or seizures) are unconstitutional, there is a two-part reasonableness
test. First, it must be "reasonable to conduct the particular search"
or seizure.2 s Second, the search or seizure must be conducted in a
reasonable manner. 0 Warrantless searches are "per se unreason-
able," except under special circumstances.3' For instance, at the
international border, warrantless and suspicionless searches have
been deemed reasonable and allowed under the border search ex-
25. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) ("[T]hen and there was the first
scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the
child Independence was born." (quoting John Adams)); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures
in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 (2005).
27. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966).
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
29. JOHN WESLEY HALL, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 178 (3d ed. 2000).
30. Id.
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
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ception 2 This exception, however, was never meant, nor has the
case law ever extended it, to allow the government to conduct
warrantless and suspicionless seizures of property."3
A. The Border Search Exception
The border search exception originated in the same Congress
that passed the Fourth Amendment and, less famously, passed the
Act of July 31, 1789, which allowed border officials to conduct
warrantless searches of ships or vessels entering the United
States.34 Thus, the drafters of the Fourth Amendment foresaw a
border exception to the warrant requirement.35 This exception is
based on the "recognized right of the sovereign to control ... who and
what may enter the country. '3 As a result, the exception allows
customs officials to conduct warrantless searches of individuals
entering the United States at the border,37 or its "functional
equivalent," such as an international airport.3"
Originally, the Supreme Court's recognition of the border search
exception focused on the government's property interest in taxing
imports.39 Accordingly, in Boyd v. United States the Court stated "in
the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an
interest in them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until
such duties are paid has a right to keep them under observation, or
32. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
33. Hearing, supra note 4, at 11 (testimony of Larry Cunningham, Assistant District
Attorney, Bronx District Attorney's Office).
34. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925) ('That every collector, naval
officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose,
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have
reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise." (quoting the
Act of July 31, 1789)).
35. See Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling
Abroad?: The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REV.
161, 166 (2008).
36. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.
37. Id. at 617.
38. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (describing a St. Louis
airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City as the "functional equivalent" of the border).
39. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 314 (1998).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to pursue and drag them from concealment."4 The Court based this
decision on the distinction between the search of a citizen's home,
where the government has little interest, and the search and seizure
of goods being imported into the country, where the government has
a substantial property interest in the taxing of imports.4
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
Congress's broad power to regulate the border and prevent prohib-
ited material from entering the country in United States v.
Ramsey.42 The Court stated:
Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be "reasonable" by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into
our country from outside. There has never been any additional
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search de-
pended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding
recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause
and without a warrant are nonetheless "reasonable" has a
history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.43
In Ramsey, the Court determined that probable cause was not
needed for a border search to occur but only addressed the border
search exception." The Supreme Court has never held that a border
seizure exception to the Fourth Amendment is appropriate.45
40. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886).
41. Id. at 624. The Court later lowered the warrant requirements on items in transit
because of the temporal issues involved with obtaining a warrant for items that could easily
be moved to another jurisdiction. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
42. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
43. Id. at 619. Since Ramsey, the Court has distinguished between "routine" and
"nonroutine" border searches to determine which searches are constitutional. United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). Reasonable suspicion is needed for
"nonroutine" searches, such as strip searches, body cavity searches, and involuntary X-ray
searches. Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971, 980 (2007).
44. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
45. In Ramsey, the Court quoted United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs: "But a port
of entry is not a traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his
luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is
discovered during such a search." United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
376 (1971). This quote illustrates that the Court required customs officials to determine that
material was illegal before conducting a seizure. In other words, the Court required probable
cause.
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The Supreme Court has, however, recognized the distinction
between the seizure of a person and the seizure of property. In
Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that a person is seized
when a government official, "by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."46
Additionally, the Court held that such a seizure could only occur if
the officer based the seizure on reasonable suspicion.47 The Court,
however, views the seizure of an international traveler at the border
differently than the seizure of a person walking the streets of the
interior United States.4" This distinction is due to the border search
exception and the lower expectation of privacy that a traveler has
at the border compared to the expectation held by someone walking
along the public streets.49 As the Court noted in United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, "the Fourth Amendment's balance of
reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border
than in the interior" and, therefore, the seizure of a person in order
to conduct a border search does not require reasonable suspicion.5"
The border search exception permits the initial seizure of a traveler
to occur without reasonable suspicion, but the exception does not
allow the secondary seizure of the traveler's property without
probable cause.51
Congress codified the border search exception in a number of
statutes, including 19 U.S.C. § 482, which reads:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search
vessels may stop, search, and examine ... any vehicle, beast, or
person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is
46. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
47. Id. at 21 ("And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
48. Compare id. at 23 ("The crux of this case... [is] whether there was justification for [the
officer's] invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of
that investigation."), with United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123, 125 (1973) ("Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national
borders rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic
regulations."), and United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
('Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement
of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.").
49. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 539-40.
50. Id. at 538.
51. Id. at 538-41.
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merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law,... and if any such officer or other person so authorized shall
find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or
person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have
reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been
unlawfully introduced into the United States, ... he shall seize
and secure the same for trial.52
This statute seemingly mirrors the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
and provides federal agencies with plenary authority to conduct
searches but requires "reasonable cause" for the seizure of any
property.53 Despite Congress's efforts to clarify the authority of the
CBP, the border search exception has been challenged twice; both
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals upheld the excep-
tion.54
B. Federal Appellate Court Decisions
According to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, customs officials do
not need to have reasonable suspicion to search the electronic
devices of travelers.55 Neither court, however, analyzed whether
suspicionless seizures of electronic files would fall under the border
search exception to the Fourth Amendment; their decisions focused
on only suspicionless searches.56
In United States v. Ickes, customs officials stopped Ickes at the
United States-Canada border, searched his van, found child pornog-
52. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2006). Congress also enacted 19 U.S.C. § 1582, which reads, "all
persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and
search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such regulations." Id. § 1582.
53. Id. § 482.
54. See United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393
F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
55. See Arnold, 523 F.3d at 946; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505 n. 1 ("[S]earches of belongings at
the border 'are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border."' (quoting
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004))).
56. In Ickes, the Fourth Circuit held "that the government was authorized by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a) to search Ickes's computer and disks." Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505. In Arnold, the Ninth
Circuit was "satisfied that reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search
a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border." Arnold, 523 F.3d at 946.
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raphy, and arrested him.57 The Fourth Circuit cited the applicable
statute:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any
vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the
customs waters, ... or at any other authorized place ... and
examine the manifest and other documents and papers and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part
thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.5"
Ickes claimed that this statute's language did not cover the search
and subsequent seizure of his computer and disks. 9 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument, applying a broad meaning to the
statute, and declared that "[t]o hold otherwise would undermine the
long-standing practice of seizing goods at the border even when the
type of good is not specified in the statute."' The statute, however,
sanctions the seizure of material only when it "appear[s] that a
breach of the laws of the United States is being or has been commit-
ted."61 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit recognized the authority of
customs officials to conduct suspicionless border searches of
electronic devices but remained silent regarding the seizure of such
devices without probable cause.62
United States v. Arnold also involved the transportation of child
pornography on a laptop across the border.63 Arnold was arrested
after customs officials searched his laptop following a trip to the
Philippines.' The Ninth Circuit held that "reasonable suspicion is
not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal
57. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502.
58. Id. at 503-04 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000)).
59. Id. at 504.
60. Id. The court cited three cases in support of the seizure of material in Ickes, but in
each instance probable cause existed before the seizure occurred. See United States v. Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150-51 (2004) (marijuana was seized after it was discovered during
a border search of Flores-Montano's gas tank); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1009-
10 (5th Cir. 2001) (agents found child pornography on the defendant's laptop before seizing
the laptop); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 1985) (cocaine was seized
after it was discovered during a border search).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(e) (2000).
62. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505.
63. 523 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2008).
64. Id. at 943. The district court had ruled that the search required reasonable suspicion
and declared the search of the laptop unconstitutional. That decision was reversed. Id. at 945.
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electronic storage devices at the border." 5 In this case as well, the
customs officials seized the laptop and storage devices after they
had discovered the pornographic images of minors on the
computer.66 Thus, the customs officials had probable cause before
performing the seizure." Additionally, the Ninth Circuit never
discussed whether the suspicionless seizure of electronic files would
be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth and Ninth Circuit decisions, together with the
Supreme Court's decision in Ramsey, lead to one conclusion
regarding the border search exception: courts have authorized only
suspicionless border searches, not suspicionless seizures. Allowing
government agents to seize property and electronic files without
probable cause runs contrary to the authorizing statutes and
overextends the border search exception, but as Part II will explain,
that is exactly what the CBP Policy authorizes.
II. THE CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION POLICY
The CBP's policies regarding the seizure of items from interna-
tional travelers have evolved over time and, in recent years, they
have become more intrusive." These changes prompted the Asian
Law Society and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to sue the
Department of Homeland Security under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), requesting the "release of agency records concern-
ing CBP's policies and procedures on the questioning, search, and
inspection of travelers entering or returning to the United States at
ports of entry."69 In response, the Department of Homeland Security
released two document productions containing various manuals,
memoranda, emails, and briefings regarding the CBP policies from
65. Id. at 946. The court pointed out two possible exceptions as to which the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled: 1) "exceptional damage to property;" and 2) a "particularly offensive"
search. Id. (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56).
66. Id. at 943.
67. Id. (describing how customs officials "found numerous images depicting what they
believed to be child pornography" before seizing Arnold's laptop).
68. Nakashima, supra note 7, at A2.
69. Complaint at 1-2, Asian Law Caucus, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 08-
0842 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.eff.orgtcases/foia-litigation-border-
searches.
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2000 until 2008.70 These documents illustrate a recognition amongst
the CBP that the seizure of documents or electronic files requires
some form of heightened suspicion-a requirement that, in practice,
the current CBP policy ignores.
A. The Evolution of the CBP Policy
In 2000, a Customs Directive entitled "Procedures for Examining
Documents and Papers" stated that probable cause was required to
seize any items and that "[a]n officer must have probable cause to
believe a document or paper is subject to seizure, to copy it."'" Five
years later, the CBP issued another set of guidelines for reviewing
documents stating, "Seizure of... documents requires probable cause
that the documents have been altered, are counterfeit, or are
otherwise evidence of a crime, or the fruit or instrumentality of a
crime. ' 72 These past policies indicate that, until recently, the CBP
disallowed the seizure of travelers' property without probable cause.
In July 2007, however, the CBP issued Interim Procedures for
Border Search/Examination of Documents, Papers, and Electronic
Information.7 ' These procedures instructed that customs "officers
may copy and transmit documents and information from electronic
devices only where there is reasonable suspicion that ... the
information may relate to, terrorist activities or other unlawful
conduct. '74 The requirement of reasonable suspicion was reiterated
in an email forwarding instructions sent by the Field Office to Port
Directors dated February 8, 2008.7' The email informed customs
agents that copying documents must be based on reasonable sus-
70. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, FOIA: Border Searches, http://www.eff.org/cases/
foia-litigation-border-searches (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
71. Commissioner of Customs, Customs Directive: Procedures for Examining Documents
and Papers 3 (Feb. 4, 2000) (CBP FOLA production available at http://www.eff.org/cases/foia-
litigation-border-searches).
72. Updated Guidelines for Returning Persons Who Present Fraudulent Documents and
Disposition of the Seized Documents 3 (Jan. 14, 2005) (CBP FOIA production available at
http://www.eff.orgtcases/foia-litigation-border-searches).
73. Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations, Interim Procedures for
Border Search/Examination of Documents, Papers, and Electronic Information (July 5, 2007)
(CBP FOIA production available at http://www.eff.orgtcases/foia-litigation-border-searches).
74. Id. at 2.
75. Email to "Port Directors" (Feb. 8, 2008, 11:32) (CBP FOLA production available at
http://www.eff.org/cases/foia-litigation-border-searches).
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picion and "documents and information from electronic devices or
electronic storage media should not be reviewed longer than a
'glance" without reasonable suspicion. v6 So as recently as February
2008, the CBP still required reasonable suspicion in order for
customs officials to copy or seize documents."
B. The Current CBP Policy
The current CBP policy was published in July 2008 in response
to the pending FOIA lawsuit and a Senate Hearing.7" On its face,
the policy strengthens the suspicion requirement and requires
probable cause to "seize" electronic devices or copies thereof. The
policy reads:
Detention and Review by Officers. Officers may detain docu-
ments and electronic devices, or copies thereof, for a reasonable
period of time to perform a thorough border search. The search
may take place on-site or at an off-site location. Except as noted
in section D below, if after reviewing the information there is not
probable cause to seize it, any copies of the information must be
destroyed. All actions surrounding the detention will be docu-
mented by the officer and certified by the Supervisor.79
On the day the policy was published, former Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff wrote an editorial defending it and
claimed, "[A]ny U.S. citizen's information that is copied to facilitate
a search is retained only if relevant to a lawful purpose such as a
criminal or national security investigation, and otherwise is
erased.""° The problem, however, is that customs officials can act
without suspicion, copy the hard drives of electronic devices, and
review them for the amount of time necessary to conduct a "thor-
ough" search. This procedure is the equivalent of a seizure without
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Complaint at 1, Asian Law Caucus, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 08-
0842 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.eff.orglcases/foia-litigation-border-
searches; Hearing, supra note 4, at 142-43 (statement of S. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
79. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
80. Michael Chertoff, Editorial, Opposing View: Searches are Legal, Essential, USA
TODAY, July 16, 2008, http://blogs.usatoday.comoped/200807/opposing-view-s.html.
304 [Vol. 51:291
2009] SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEIZURES OF ELECTRONIC FILES 305
probable cause. This conclusion is more evident when one considers
that, under the current CBP procedures, hard drive searches can
take many weeks to complete."' Furthermore, simply copying or im-
aging the hard drive could qualify as a seizure, "[b]ecause imaging
generally requires commandeering the computer and disabling
access to the computer for a matter of hours." 2 Consequently,
despite the probable cause language contained in the CBP Policy, in
reality agents are permitted to conduct warrantless, suspicionless
seizures of travelers' electronic devices.
The CBP Policy also allows for the off-site inspection of electronic
devices for a reasonable amount of time. 3 Recent technological
advances, however, provide customs officials with the capability to
conduct more efficient searches that do not require off-site detention
of the computers or files.' For example, using COFEE (Computer
Online Forensic Evidence Extractor), a device Microsoft developed
in February 2008, customs agents could scan online evidence,
decrypt passwords, and analyze a computer's stored data on-site and
receive results within minutes.8 5
Even if the searches remain on-site, they must still be completed
within a reasonable amount of time in order to strike the proper
Fourth Amendment balance. 6 The Supreme Court has "consistently
rejected hard-and-fast time limits," but in the realm of border
searches, a few decisions provide some guidance. 7 In United States
v. Flores-Montano, the Court upheld a nearly hour-long suspi-
cionless search involving the partial disassembly of a traveler's car
81. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing how
two weeks passed between the search of Arnold's laptop and the issuance of an arrest
warrant).
82. Kerr, supra note 26, at 561.
83. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
84. Hearing, supra note 4, at 183-85 (statement of Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney,
Electronic Frontier Foundation).
85. Id. at 183.
86. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) ("[The brevity of the invasion of
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether
the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable.").
87. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985) (citing United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)). Regarding domestic searches, the Court held in Place
that, absent probable cause, "we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged
90-minute period involved here." Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10.
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at the Mexican-American border.' However, in United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, the Court held that the sixteen-hour
detention of a suspect thought to be "smuggling contraband in her
alimentary canal" required reasonable suspicion.89 And recently, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was reasonable to
detain a group of Muslim-Americans, without suspicion, for nearly
six hours during a border search.9 ° Given these parameters and the
constantly increasing storage space of electronic devices,9 the CBP
should amend the policy and order officials to complete all searches
within six hours, unless the situation absolutely requires a longer
search.92
During searches, the CBP Policy also authorizes customs officials
to take notes summarizing the search.93 Indeed, customs officers
should be encouraged to take notes regarding the motivation for
each border search, who was searched, and what, if anything, was
found. These notes would allow the CBP to keep better records
regarding whether certain individuals actually pose a threat to the
United States. There must, however, be limitations placed on this
reporting due to the millions of bits of information that computers
and digital devices contain.94 In fact, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California addressed the issue of
customs officials keeping records after a determination that the
records are unrelated to the authorizing statute.95 The court held,
"Once it is determined that seized materials do not violate [the
statute], no records may be made or retained which describe the
content of the seized material or from which the identity of the
person from whom the materials were seized may be ascertained."96
88. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004).
89. 473 U.S. 531, 536, 541 (1985).
90. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2007).
91. The new iPod, for example, can hold up to 30,000 songs, 150 hours of video, and 25,000
pictures. Apple-iPod Classic-Features, http://www.apple.com/ipodclassidfeatures.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
reasonable suspicion was necessary for a border search that lasted only four hours).
93. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 1. The Supreme Court held that government officials
taking notes during a search does not amount to a seizure. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
324 (1987).
94. Kerr, supra note 26, at 542-43.
95. Heidy v. U.S. Customs Serv., 681 F. Supp. 1445, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
96. Id.
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The CBP Policy's reporting provision can serve a very useful
purpose, but the CBP must monitor which records should be
retained or destroyed.
Moreover, despite its shortcomings, the CBP Policy does aid the
government in preventing illegal or dangerous material from
entering the country. These items include everything from drugs
and child pornography to terrorist materials and plans.98 The
Fourth Amendment, however, requires a balance between these
reasonable government interests and the privacy and property
interests of those subjected to searches or seizures.99 This balance
shifts at ports of entry in the government's favor because the
"[g]overnment's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border."'00
Despite this shift, professor Larry Cunningham testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee: 'I am aware of no authority that
would permit the government, without probable cause to believe it
contains contraband, to keep a person's laptop or to copy the
contents of its files."' 0'1 Under the current case law, however,
Professor Cunningham may be mistaken, 10 2 but this uncertainty
illustrates the disagreement among scholars and the courts
regarding what rights the Fourth Amendment protects-the right
to privacy, property, security, or some combination thereof.
0 3
97. See Ahern, supra note 14; Chertoff, supra note 80.
98. See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting 6 U.S.C. §
11 (b)(1) (stating that an aspect of the CBP's new "primary mission" is to "prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States")); United States v. Bunty, No. 07-641, 2008 WL 2371211
(E.D. Pa. June 10, 2008) (denying defendant's motion to suppress child pornography found on
his computer following a border search); People v. Endacott, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1346, 1347
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a border search of a laptop that contained child pornography
did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
99. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Katz and the War on Terrorism, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1219, 1222-24 (2008).
100. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
101. Hearing, supra note 4, at 11 (testimony of Larry Cunningham).
102. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) ("[Ihe mere recording of the serial
numbers did not constitute a seizure.").
103. Clancy, supra note 39, at 308.
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III. SEARCH V. SEIZURE: WHAT RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED?
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the exact freedoms that
the Fourth Amendment protects has evolved over time and contin-
ues to arouse debate among legal scholars. 104 The Court's current
jurisprudence involves a bifurcation of the Fourth Amendment
where the Search Clause protects privacy rights and the Seizure
Clause protects property rights. °5
A. The Seizure Clause and the Jacobsen Test
The Court originally based its interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment entirely in property rights and tied the reasonable-
ness of both a search or a seizure to whether the government's
property interest was greater than that of the property owner.'
l 6
Additionally, in 1928, the Court held that the search and seizure
clauses only applied to tangible items.' 7 This property-based
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment continued until the 1960s
when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment also protects
privacy.' The test that has endured following the Court's decision
104. See id. at 308 (describing changes in the Supreme Court's analysis over time); G.
Robert McLain, Jr., Note, United States v. Hill- A New Rule, But No Clarity for the Rules
Governing Computer Searches and Seizures, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071, 1077 (2007) ("On
one side are those who believe that fundamental differences between physical and digital
searches make it impossible to apply existing Fourth Amendment rules governing searches
of physical containers and documents to computers and data. On the other side are those who
believe that computers and computer media are best conceptualized as containers and
documents, thereby allowing existing Fourth Amendment rules to be applied to computer
searches.").
105. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (discussing the two types
of "expectations" that the Fourth Amendment protects--one expectation regarding searches
and another regarding seizures).
106. Clancy, supra note 39, at 312 ("Beginning with Boyd v. United States and extending
to the latter third of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court defined the interest secured
by the Fourth Amendment largely in terms of property rights.").
107. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) ("The [Fourth] Amendment itself
shows that the search is to be of material things--the person, the house, his papers or his
effects.").
108. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise
that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited.").
308
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in United States v. Katz is the "expectation of privacy" test,"0 9
articulated in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion." 0 Justice Harlan
stated, 'My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.""" The Court, however, only applied the
privacy standard to review the reasonableness of searches, while
retaining the property standard for seizures.
112
In 1984, the Court articulated the current test for what consti-
tutes a seizure."' According to the Jacobsen test, the government
seizes an item when there is "meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests."" 4 The language in Jacobsen,
however, indicates that the Court wished only to expound upon
what was sufficient to constitute a seizure and not what was
necessary for a seizure to occur." 5 In other words, the Court thought
that a meaningful interference with a possessory interest would
meet the criteria for a seizure, but that should not be the lone test
for what qualifies as a seizure. This is evident from the Court's
reasoning in Jacobsen. The Court stated that the definition for a
seizure "follows from our oft-repeated definition of the 'seizure' of a
person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.""' 6 The
reasoning behind applying the same seizure standard to both
human beings and to objects is flawed, because such a standard fails
to recognize the seizure of intangible items. This is an important
109. JOHN WESLEY HALL, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 20-21 (3d ed. 2000).
110. Clancy, supra note 39, at 328-29.
111. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Katz
decision, however, did not completely settle the debate over the proper Fourth Amendment
standard. In 1992, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that "our cases unmistakably hold that
the [Fourth] Amendment protects property as well as privacy." Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U.S. 56, 62 (1992).
112. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ('The [Fourth]
Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen-the interest in retaining
possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy. A seizure threatens
the former, a search the latter.").
113. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 (1984).
114. Id. at 113; HALL, supra note 109, at 27.
115. Paul Ohm, The Olmstedian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and the Seizure
of Intangible Property, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 27 (2008), available at http://stlr.
stanford.edu/pdf/ohm-olmsteadian-seizure-clause.pdf.
116. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5.
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distinction because intangible items can be copied and stored
without much, if any, interference with a possessory interest.
B. Search First, Seizure Second
One reason for the Court's focus on property interests as opposed
to privacy interests when analyzing seizures is the fact that almost
all seizures are predicated by a search."7 Consequently, so long as
the initial search was reasonable, the suspect's privacy rights have
not been violated. This reasoning is echoed in the Court's develop-
ment of the "plain view" doctrine, which allows officials to seize
illegal material-without a warrant-as long as the material is
discovered during an otherwise reasonable search."' The plain view
doctrine, however, has three limitations: 1) the officer must "not
violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place" where the
evidence is in plain view; 2) the incriminating character of the
evidence must be "immediately apparent;" and 3) the officer must
have the lawful right to access the evidence." 9
During a customs official's routine border search, the final prong
of the plain view doctrine is always satisfied due to the border
search exception-the search is always deemed reasonable. 2 ° The
first and second prongs, however, are only satisfied under certain
circumstances. For example, if a customs official seizes a laptop for
later review, as the CBP Policy allows,' the first and second
prongs of this three-part test are not satisfied. In such a scenario,
the incriminating evidence cannot be "immediately apparent" if
the customs official has not reviewed the files in the laptop.
Furthermore, the seizure of the laptop, absent probable cause,
would be an action that no court has condoned under the border
search exception. 122 On the other hand, if the laptop was searched
117. Ohm, supra note 115, at 32.
118. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971)); PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK, 219-20 (2005).
119. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37.
120. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) ("Time and again, we
have stated that searches made at the border ... are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border.").
121. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
122. Hearing, supra note 4, at 12 (testimony of Larry Cunningham).
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first, illegal material was found in it, and then it was seized, that
scenario would fall within the plain view doctrine. Requiring a
customs official to possess probable cause before copying electronic
files follows the plain view doctrine's requirements and strikes the
required Fourth Amendment balance between government interests
and the interests of the travelers.'23 This conclusion, however, relies
upon one key assumption-that copying a computer file is indeed a
seizure.
IV. IS COPYING COMPUTER FILES CONSIDERED A SEIZURE?
In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Hicks that simply
copying something does not constitute a seizure.'24 As a result,
copying information, such as a computer hard drive, has not been
deemed a seizure under current Fourth Amendment analysis.'25
Hicks, however, involved a police officer simply writing down the
serial numbers from a stereo system that he suspected was stolen.'26
The Court's holding followed the same logic as the 1928 case of
Olmstead v. United States.2 ' In Olmstead, the Court relied on a
property-based standard to examine the reasonableness of a seizure
and held that the Fourth Amendment applied to only tangible
items.'28 Recently, one legal scholar stated, 'The Seizure Clause is
in an Olmsteadian holding pattern, consistently interpreted to
protect only physical property rights and to regulate only the
deprivation of tangible things."'29 Consequently, the majority of
123. An email sent to all Port Directors in February 2008 urged "the importance of
developing the appropriate level of suspicion before conducting a search." Email to "Port
Directors," supra note 75. So only months before the new policy was published the CBP
understood that a balance had to be struck between the interests of the government and the
rights of the individuals passing through customs.
124. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
125. Kerr, supra note 26, at 548.
126. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
127. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); see also Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1961) (citing Olmstead and holding that a physical invasion is
required to invoke the Fourth Amendment).
128. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 ("Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated
as against a defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects.").
129. Ohm, supra note 115, at 2.
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courts have yet to recognize that copying computer files is a seizure
subject to Fourth Amendment protection. 130
In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis, referenc-
ing the Fourth Amendment, stated that "[clauses guaranteeing to
the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must
have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.' 13' Now,
over eighty years since the Olmstead decision, this ability to adapt
is even more important given our rapidly changing, technologically
driven society. For example, a computer hard drive can hold over
eighty gigabytes of information, which is equivalent to approxi-
mately forty million pages of text. 132 Although the capacity of hard
drives continues to grow, the standard for what constitutes a seizure
has remained the same. There is no rationale available that could
equate copying a computer hard drive to writing down the serial
number of a stereo system. But the Hicks decision remains the
controlling precedent because courts continue to improperly focus on
whether a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests" has occurred. 1
33
A. The Jacobsen Test and the Seizure of Electronic Files
The Supreme Court has not defined the exact meaning of one's
"possessory interest," but thus far the phrase has been interpreted
narrowly as a 'binary state of possession."34 In other words, one
must have physical possession of an item to have a possessory
interest. 135 As a result, when an alleged seizure involves tangible
items, the Jacobsen test works well.13 This test, however, becomes
more troublesome when intangible property, such as electronic data,
130. See, e.g., United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. May 23, 2001) (holding that copying the data from a computer in Russia is not a
seizure).
131. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. Kerr, supra note 26, at 542.
133. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
134. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Ohm, supra note 115, at 14.
135. Ohm, supra note 115, at 14.
136. In the Macon case, the Court held that the police did not obtain possession of obscene
magazines through an illegal seizure because the original owner's possessory interest
transferred from the magazines to the money paid for them during the purchase. Macon, 472
U.S. at 469-71.
312 [Vol. 51:291
2009] SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEIZURES OF ELECTRONIC FILES 313
is involved.13 v According to the Court, one's possessory interest
remains unchanged when a copy is made because the owner still has
control over the original and, thus, no seizure has occurred. 3 '
Under this property-based interpretation, courts have determined
that a seizure requires a physical dispossession and, consequently,
the copying of information does not constitute a seizure.1 39 For
instance, in United States v. Gorshkov, a defendant accused of
computer hacking claimed that the government's evidence should be
excluded because the FBI illegally copied his computer files and
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.4 ° The district court was not
convinced and, citing Hicks, held that:
the agents' act of copying the data on the Russian computers
was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it did
not interfere with Defendant's or anyone else's possessory
interest in the data. The data remained intact and unaltered. It
remained accessible to Defendant and any co-conspirators or
partners with whom he had shared access. The copying of the
data had absolutely no impact on his possessory rights. There-
fore it was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.'
Similarly, in United States v. Thomas, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that making copies of obscene material did not qualify
as a seizure, basing the decision on property interests and not
privacy interests.' In Thomas, a UPS package accidentally broke
open to reveal obscene material; UPS contacted the FBI, who copied
the material and sought a warrant. 143 The Tenth Circuit stated, "A
'seizure' is a taking of property. It involves 'a forcible or secretive
dispossession.' The materials herein remained in UPS's possession
137. Ohm, supra note 115, at 7.
138. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987).
139. Id. See also United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing the photocopying of a letter during a border search as "a search beyond a routine
inspection," not a seizure).
140. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash.
May 23, 2001).
141. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
142. United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1980). Additionally, see Bills
v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992), in which the court relied on Hicks to hold that
photographing a scene did not interfere with a possessory interest.
143. Thomas, 613 F.2d at 789.
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and their delivery was unaffected since they were undeliverable.
The materials were searched but not seized."'1
44
Suspicionless border seizures, however, raise a different set of
issues and concerns than the Thomas and Gorshkov cases because
in each case probable cause was present prior to the seizure. In
Thomas, UPS employees called the FBI after the package had
ripped open to reveal the obscene material.145 In Gorshkov, the FBI
had been investigating the defendant for months for computer
hacking.'46 The CBP Policy does not require any level of suspicion
before the hard drives or files on electronic devices may be copied or
seized. 147
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took a small step in the correct
direction in United States v. Fortna and ruled that a heightened
level of suspicion was needed for customs officials to photocopy
documents. 48 The court held, 'We do not suggest that customs
agents may photocopy material inspected at the border for other
than good faith, legitimate governmental purposes."'49 In Fortna,
customs officials copied the documents of a suspected drug dealer
but only after receiving information from an FBI informant who was
working undercover with the suspect. ° The Fifth Circuit stopped
short of calling the photocopying a seizure, but the court correctly
pointed out the need for a heightened level of suspicion.' 5 '
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seemingly struck the correct
balance and, in United States v. Ziegler, stated that the copying of
a computer hard drive is a seizure.'52 Ziegler, however, addressed
144. Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 792-93 (discussing the FBI's review of the obscene material before the copies
were made).
146. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1 (describing how Gorshkov had demonstrated his
hacking abilities to undercover agents before being arrested).
147. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2-3.
148. United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 727-29.
151. Id. at 738. The Eastern District of New York cited the Fortna case and applied "a
reasonable suspicion standard in determining the lawfulness of the actions of border officials
in closely reading and photocopying of documents." United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp.
2d 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
152. United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184,1190 (9th Cir. 2007) ('The remaining question
is whether the search of Ziegler's office and the copying of his hard drive were 'unreasonable'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.... [The government does not deny that the
search and seizure were without a warrant.").
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whether the search and seizure of a computer with the consent of the
employer still required a warrant and, as a result, the statements
regarding the seizure of the hard drive are dicta.153 The Ninth and
Fifth Circuits, nevertheless, have correctly recognized that copying
a document or a computer file is different than merely conducting
a preliminary search."5 4 These decisions demonstrate that at least
some courts understand the need for the Supreme Court to change
its interpretation regarding the copying of electronic files.'
B. Copying Electronic Files Under Katz and Berger
In order to properly protect the rights of travelers, the Supreme
Court should abandon its property-based seizure standard and
return to the standard it set in the Katz and Berger cases. 5 ' Both
cases involved government officials recording the voices of suspects
and, in each case, the Court held that the government had illegally
seized the suspect's voice-equating the conversations to property
in which the suspects had a privacy interest.'57 In Berger, the Court
struck down a New York statute governing wiretaps, because the
statute should have particularly described "the communications,
conversations, or discussions to be seized."' 8 In Katz, the Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral state-
ments."" '9 These cases, decided before the Jacobsen and Hicks cases,
153. Id. at 1185, 1190 ("We must determine whether an employee has an expectation of
privacy in his workplace computer sufficient to suppress images of child pornography sought
to be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution.").
154. In United States v. Sejan, the Ninth Circuit held that customs officials could read a
letter without any heightened suspicion. 547 F.3d 993, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We cannot
reasonably expect customs officials wholly to abandon their sensory faculties when conducting
inspections under the plenary authority of a border search.").
155. See, e.g., Ziegler, 474 F.3d at 1190 (describing the copying of a hard drive as both a
search and seizure).
156. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
58-59 (1967).
157. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59.
158. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59 ("We believe the statute here is equally offensive. First, as
we have mentioned, eavesdropping is authorized without requiring belief that any particular
offense has been or is being committed; nor that the 'property' sought, the conversations, be
particularly described.").
159. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
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indicate that the Court intended the Fourth Amendment's Seizure
Clause to apply to both intangible and tangible items.160
The copying of electronic files merits the same treatment as the
oral recordings at the heart of both Katz and Berger for two reasons.
First, unlike tangible property, these items can be seized without
the knowledge of the owner through electronic eavesdropping
techniques or computer hacking.'6' Second, emails and Internet
chats increasingly are replacing conversations that once took place
over the telephone." 2 But unlike phone calls, each email or Internet
chat leaves a "transcript" behind that can be copied from a com-
puter. Currently, the Supreme Court's property-based interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment allows all of these transcripts to be
copied from a laptop or electronic device passing through customs.' 6 3
In order to provide these transcripts with the same protection
afforded telephone conversations, the Supreme Court should apply
the Katz/Berger standard to the border seizure of electronic files. As
the world continues to move towards becoming a paperless society,
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must
expand to once again protect intangible property.
C. Copying Electronic Files and the Proper Application of the
Jacobsen Test
Even if the Supreme Court continues to apply the Jacobsen test
to the Seizure Clause, the copying of electronic files without
probable cause should qualify as a meaningful interference with a
possessory interest and, thus, an unreasonable seizure. This con-
clusion is reached through a simple application of current property
law. Black's Law Dictionary defines property as "[t]he right to
160. Ohm, supra note 115, at 10, 14-16.
161. As Justice Brandeis wrote in 1928 in his dissenting opinion in the Olmstead case,
"Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438,474
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
162. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Johnathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery:
The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO
L. REv. 347, 355 (2008) ("For example, a typical employee at a large company will write or
receive at least fifty emails per day. If that company has one hundred thousand employees,
the company could be sending and receiving over 1.5 billion emails annually.").
163. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987); CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
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possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing .... Also, termed bundle
of rights."'" Included in this bundle of rights is the right of the
owner to exclude others and the owner's right to destroy the
property, both of which courts have found to be essential to physical
possession. 6 '
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed the rights to
exclude and destroy in New Hampshire v. Nelson.'66 In this case, the
defendant landlord took some intimate photographs from a tenant's
residence, scanned them onto his computer, and then returned the
original photographs to the tenant's apartment.'67 The defendant
was charged with receipt of stolen property but claimed that the
government could not prove that he had the "purpose to deprive"
because he returned the photographs.'68 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court did not agree, stating that "integral to ownership ...
is the right to exclude others from possessing, using and enjoying a
particular item of property."'69 The court continued, "though the
defendant returned the original photographs, he kept a computer
reproduction of the captured images, without permission, and it is
these images he was convicted of unlawfully retaining."'7 °
The same standard should apply to the government's actions
regarding the suspicionless, warrantless copying of computer files.
Once a traveler's electronic files are copied, that traveler loses the
right to destroy that property because the government now controls
an exact replica. Accordingly, even under the Jacobsen test, the
copying of electronic files constitutes a seizure, subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. Thus, regardless of whether a court applies
a property- or privacy-based standard, copying electronic files is a
seizure and is only reasonable when government officials possess
probable cause.
164. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1252 (8th ed. 2004).
165. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 794 (2005).
166. 842 A.2d 83 (N.H. 2004).
167. Id. at 84.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 86.
170. Id. ('CThough the medium changed from photographic paper to a computer, the
photographic images themselves remained 'property of another.').
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V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE CBP POLICY
In addition to allowing seizures without probable cause, the CBP
Policy also lacks appropriate safeguards against possible govern-
ment abuses. These abuses include the possibility of other govern-
ment agencies using the border search exception as a loophole to
avoid Fourth Amendment requirements, the use of racial and
religious profiling, and the inadvertent disclosure of privileged and
confidential material.
A. A Possible Fourth Amendment Loophole
One concern is that government officials could exploit the border
search exception to evade the Fourth Amendment's search and
seizure requirements.171 An incident involving apparent overreach-
ing occurred in the spring of 2008 when government officials
detained two British Aerospace (BAE) executives and searched their
laptops and electronic equipment.172 BAE has been under federal
investigation for allegedly violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act following its involvement in an $84 billion deal between the
British and Saudi Arabian governments in 1985.173 It is not known
if government officials copied the executives' files, but the CBP
Policy would allow them to take such action. 7 4 David Gourevitch, a
white collar defense attorney, commented on the possibility of the
government's use of border searches for other investigations: "It
sounds like the DoJ investigators are not getting what they hoped
for as quickly as they hoped .... A stop [into the U.S.] by executives
is a perfect way to do that.'1 75 Although the facts of the BAE
incident are unclear, it demonstrates that government officials could
171. Hearing, supra note 4, at 7 (statement of Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic
Frontier Foundation).
172. See Sylvia Pfeifer, BAE Executives Held as US Steps Up Arms Deal Probe, FIN. TIMES,
May 19, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/le2a74eO-253b-lldd-al4a-000077
b07658.html.
173. Vidya Ram, BAE Burrows Into The U.S., June 6, 2008, http://www.forbes.com2008
06/03/bae-army-trucks-markets-equity-cxvrz_0603markets08.html.
174. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
175. Pfeifer, supra note 172.
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use the border search exception to accelerate investigations and
circumvent the normal Fourth Amendment safeguards.
In 1994, a New York state court tried to limit the reach of the
government and held that customs officials could only seize evidence
that fell within the authorizing statutes.176 These federal statutes,
however, grant the CBP very broad authority to search and seize
anything "introduced into the United States in any manner contrary
to law." '177 The statutes also allow the CBP to seize "merchandise
which is [clandestinely] introduced or attempted to be introduced
into the United States contrary to law."'78 As a result, these stat-
utes, coupled with the CBP Policy, seemingly permit the Depart-
ment of Justice and other government agencies to use the border
search exception as a loophole to conduct warrantless seizures-
without the necessary suspicion, and without the proper respect to
the Fourth Amendment.
B. Racial and Religious Profiling
Unfortunately, the stories of Mr. Reed and Mr. Qadhi that
introduced this Note are not isolated incidents. Instead, their stories
and others indicate a pattern of racial and religious profiling among
customs officials.'79 No comprehensive study has been completed,
but instances of customs officials singling out individuals from
minority groups and repeatedly detaining them without suspicion
are becoming more and more common.8 ° In fact, such abuses led the
Asian Law Caucus to file a complaint against the Department of
176. People v. LePera, 611 N.Y.S.2d 394, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
By going further and seizing the records on behalf of the local police, the customs
inspector exceeded his authority.... [The limited border search exception "was
granted to customs officials for a particular purpose; it may not be used to
circumvent the constitutional requirement of probable cause placed upon police
officers."
(quoting People v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 160 (N.Y. 1975)).
177. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2006).
178. Id. § 1595a(c).
179. See MacFarquhar, supra note 12 ("But Muslim Americans say they are having a
harder time than most, sometimes facing an intimidating maze of barriers, if not outright
discrimination. Advocacy groups have taken to labeling their predicament 'traveling while
Muslim,' and accuse the government of ignoring a serious erosion of civil rights.").
180. See, e.g., Editorial, The Government and Your Laptop, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/opinion/l0thu3.html?_r-l.
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Homeland Security, alleging that the actions of customs officials
have raised the "concern that [travelers] are being singled out
because of racial, ethnic, or religious profiling."'' The Department
of Homeland Security has denied any such profiling, and former
Secretary Chertoff testified in a July 2008 Senate Judiciary
Committee hearing that "U.S. citizens are not treated differently
based upon their ethnic background, but their individualized
behavior could be a basis for singling them out, or if they matched
a physical description it could be a basis for singling them out."' 2
Despite these assurances, the Director of the Muslim Advocates,
Farhana Y. Khera, testified at the same Senate hearing and
described the stories of many Muslim Americans who have been
stopped, detained, and harassed as they tried to reenter the
country.' Slight modifications to DHS and CBP policies, such as
proper maintenance of the terrorist watch list and increased
information-sharing among government agencies, could further the
goals of law enforcement, while protecting the rights of law-abiding
citizens such as those Ms. Khera described. Although these profiling
allegations are reprehensible, the failures of the CBP Policy go well
beyond profiling and reach a much larger segment of society.
C. Privileged and Confidential Material
The shortcomings of the CBP Policy affect every traveler carrying
information abroad. For instance, attorneys and businesspeople who
wish to protect privileged or confidential information face very
serious problems when confronted with the potential seizure of their
181. Complaint at 14, Asian Law Caucus, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 08-0842
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.eff.org/cases/foia-litigation-border-searches.
182. Hearing, supra note 4, at 57 (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
183. Id. at 134. Other examples include: 1) a California businessman who had his laptop
removed from his presence for more than two hours after returning from the Hajj, a religious
pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia; 2) a San Francisco software engineer reported being questioned
for nearly twenty hours following three trips abroad, and the customs officials inspected his
laptop and took notes; 3) another California engineer had his cell phone confiscated for five
months before it was returned, broken; and 4) a Muslim American, who has testified in front
of Congress on ways to improve information technology in America and has received national
recognition for his work on religious equality, reported being "detained whenever he reentered
the country." Id.
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laptops or electronic devices. The CBP Policy tries to address sit-
uations involving confidential documents:
If an officer suspects that the content of such a document may
constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determi-
nation within the jurisdiction of CBP, the officer must seek
advice from the Associate/Assistant Chief Counsel or the
appropriate U.S. Attorney's office before conducting a search of
the document." 4
The policy's problem, however, is that in order to determine if the
content of the document contains such evidence, the customs agent
must search it before turning it over to the U.S. Attorney's Office.
This creates a problem for many professionals, including psycho-
therapists, journalists, doctors, and social workers.'
The issues confronting attorneys are two-fold as the inadvertent
disclosure of client documents or work product materials raises
both attorney-client privilege concerns and ethical concerns."8
Regarding attorney-client privilege, jurisdictions have adopted three
separate standards to determine if the privilege has been waived
through an inadvertent disclosure to a third party." 7 In jurisdictions
following a strict standard, exposing privileged information to the
inspection of a customs official would destroy the privilege-perhaps
exposing the attorney to a malpractice lawsuit.'88 For instance, the
184. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 4.
185. See Lester M. Paredes III, The Travelers' Protection Act: Be Reasonable with My
Private Information and Equipment, 45 No. 1 CRIM. L. BuLL. 1 (2009).
186. See FED. R. EVID. 502; MODEL RULES OF PROF1L CONDUcT R. 1.6 (2007).
187. Carl Pacini, et. al., Accountants, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver
Through Inadvertent Disclosure Via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 908-
09 (2003). The first is a strict standard where any disclosure causes the document's
confidentiality to be breached "thereby destroying the basis for the continued existence of the
privilege." Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
The second approach focuses on the client's intent; inadvertent disclosures will not normally
waive privilege unless the client's intentions were to waive the privilege. Franzel v. Kerr Mfg.
Co., 600 N.W.2d 66, 74-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). Courts following the final approach examine
the circumstances surrounding the disclosure to determine if the privilege should be
considered waived. United States v. Keystone Sanitation, 885 F. Supp. 672, 676 (M.D. Pa.
1994).
188. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976,980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("To hold, as we do, that
an inadvertent disclosure will waive the privilege imposes a self-governing restraint on the
freedom with which organizations such as corporations, unions, and the like label documents
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Northern District of Illinois has stated "when the parties to the
communication themselves do not intend the communication to be
confidential or do not take reasonable steps to insure and maintain
its confidentiality, the privilege does not apply or is vitiated."18 9
Under such a standard, any attorney traveling abroad would have
to take additional precautions to preserve the attorney-client
privilege.
In addition to evidentiary concerns, the CBP Policy also raises
ethical concerns regarding client confidentiality.19 ° The American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct
that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent."191 Furthermore, Comment 16 of Rule 1.6 reads "A lawyer
must act competently to safeguard information relating to the
representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure by the lawyer."'1 92 As a result, in some jurisdictions a
lawyer could be subject to discipline if the duty of confidentiality is
breached through the border seizure of an electronic device contain-
ing confidential files.'93 Many law firms are responding to these
legal and ethical concerns and issuing "clean' laptops" to employees
traveling out of the country.'94 Additionally, in an effort to avoid
exposing confidential or privileged information, employees could
email files back to an office server and "clean" the hard drive before
returning the country.' 95
Privacy and privilege concerns extend beyond law firms to
businesses wishing to keep trade secrets and other documents
confidential. In February 2008, the Association of Corporate Travel
related to communications with counsel as privileged.").
189. Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROFWL CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
191. Id.
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007).
193. Leroy J. Tornquist & Christine R. Olson, A Last Vestige of Oregon's Wild West:
Oregon's Lawless Approach to Electronically Stored Information, 45 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 161,
202 (2008).
194. Janet I. Tu, Privacy v. Border Security: Critics Say Laptop Searches Cross the Line,
SEATrLE TIMES, July 23,2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmlflocalnews/2008067440-
searches23mO.html. These laptops contain the minimum amount of information needed for
the employee's trip.
195. Id.
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Executives conducted a survey of its members and the results
showed that 81 percent of respondents believed that having a laptop
seized could damage a traveler's professional reputation and
standing with the traveler's company. 96 These concerns regarding
confidential material, racial and religious profiling, and exploitation
of the border search exception could be redressed through litigation,
but most likely they will be remedied through legislation and some
simple adjustments to the CBP Policy.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems surrounding the CBP Policy prompted members of
Congress to propose legislation to counteract some of the CBP's
more intrusive procedures.'97 One bill, entitled the 'Travelers'
Privacy Protection Act of 2008" (the TPPA), attempted to take some
important steps in protecting the rights of travelers, but the
proposed law also overshot in certain areas and would have usurped
too much power from the CBP. For instance, the TPPA stated that
"a United States resident may be searched at the border only if an
official of the Department of Homeland Security has a reasonable
suspicion" that the citizen is violating the laws within the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security's jurisdiction.198 Requiring reasonable
suspicion to simply search an electronic device runs afoul of the
Supreme Court's longstanding recognition of the border search
exception and would likely make it too difficult for customs officials
to effectively protect America's ports of entry.'99 The TPPA did,
however, define copying electronic files as a seizure of those files but
required the possession of a warrant before any seizure can take
place.200 The warrant requirement would place an unrealistic
burden on the CBP, especially as the Court has held there are
196. Hearing, supra note 4, at 11 (statement of Susan K. Gurley, Executive Director,
Association of Corporate Travel Executives).
197. See S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008).
198. Id.
199. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,619 (1977); Ahern, supra note 14; Chertoff,
supra note 80.
200. S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement when property is in transit
and a warrant cannot readily be obtained.2 °1
The proper procedure, regardless of whether the Court or
Congress articulates it, should require customs officials to have
probable cause before copying any files or seizing any electronic
devices. This standard strikes the correct balance between the
respective interests of the government and the individual. There
should be, however, two exceptions to the probable cause standard.
First, an exception should permit the off-site decryption of encrypted
files.2 °2 The second exception would authorize the off-site analysis
of electronic files containing a foreign language that needs to be
translated. Nevertheless, these files should be copied only if the
customs official has a reasonable suspicion that they contain illegal
material. Additionally, only those files that are under reasonable
suspicion should be copied, not the entire hard drive of the elec-
tronic device. All other searches should occur on-site and within a
reasonable time. In Tabbaa v. Chertoff, the Second Circuit held that
a six-hour detention at the border was reasonable.2"3 The Supreme
Court has refused to place hard parameters on border searches,
20 4
but six hours should be the ceiling for the length of detention,
barring extreme circumstances. Customs officials should also be
trained in a manner that will allow them to conduct necessary
searches without excessive delay. Under these circumstances,
customs agents have ample opportunity to develop probable cause,
while recognizing that travelers should not have to endure extreme
delays.
201. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153, 162 (1925).
202. A federal district court in Vermont has held that a defendant charged with possession
of child pornography must supply prosecutors access to his password-protected laptop. See
Declan McCullagh, Judge Orders Defendant to Decrypt PGP-protected Laptop, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10172866-38.html (describing the court's ruling and how
customs officials discovered the illegal material but then shutdown the computer, triggering
the password protection).
203. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 100 (2nd Cir. 2007).
204. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (citing United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)).
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CONCLUSION
The CBP Policy authorizes the seizure of computer files and
electronic devices for as long as government officials deem necessary
to "perform a thorough border search. '20 ' This policy fails to properly
recognize the rights of the individual travelers entering or leaving
the United States. Initially, remedying the situation will require the
Court to recognize that, under either a property- or privacy-based
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the copying of a hard
drive without probable cause jeopardizes the rights of individuals.
Second, the Court or Congress must reign in the Department of
Homeland Security and prevent the overextension of the border
search exception. The CBP has claimed that taking these files is
necessary to protect the United States against terrorism and other
dangers. 2°6 The border search exception, however, permits customs
officials to search every traveler entering this country.2 7 Through
the border search exception the CBP has ample opportunity to
conduct searches and secure the borders of the United States.
Extending this exception to allow the suspicionless seizures of
electronic files is contrary to the original intent of the Court's border
search doctrine and the Fourth Amendment.2 8 This overextension
threatens the privacy and property rights of every citizen traveling
abroad and will only become more pervasive as technology continues
to develop. As Justice Jackson stated after serving as the chief
prosecutor during the Nuremberg Trials:
2°
[The Fourth Amendment guarantees] are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
205. CBP Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
206. Chertoff, supra note 80.
207. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
208. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (requiring
that material be deemed illegal during a border search before it can be seized).
209. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1024 n.52 (2008).
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the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government.21°
If the government is genuinely committed to protecting America and
defeating terrorism, it cannot do so by sacrificing these indispens-
able freedoms.
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